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Spenser and Europe: Britomart after Brexit 
by Willy Maley 
 
But (Lord) how she in everie member shooke, 
When as the land she saw no more appeare,  
But a wilde wildernes of waters deepe:  
Then gan she greatly to lament and weepe.1  
 
“Fog in Channel – Continent Cut Off” is an old mock headline that sums up British – 
specifically English – insularity and anti-European sentiment, or at best indifference 
to the continental landmass off the coast of Dover.2 Edmund Spenser crossed that 
channel, and another to the west, in his pursuit of a life beyond England. Spenser is 
our contemporary, and never more so than now, at a moment when a British breach 
with Europe is conjuring up the ghosts of the Reformation, and the British 
Government is looking to Ireland to bolster its power, as risky a strategy today as it 
was in Spenser’s time.3 In a recent survey of Renaissance studies, Katherine Eggert 
observes: “If contemporary politics spark dissertation topics, ones that we see in print 
after a suitable lag time for writing and publication, then Brexit and the rise of 
Trumpism might lead us in upcoming years to expect a decline in first books on 
globalism and an uptick in studies of protonationalism, theories of business and trade, 
and xenophobia”.4 In lieu of such a time lag, and in light of the tendency for history to 
repeat itself, I want to explore some of the implications of Brexit for Spenser studies, 
and for our perception of the poet’s relationship with England, Ireland, Britain, 
Europe and the world.5  
 
Three relatively recent interventions in Spenser studies by David Baker (“Historical 
Contexts: Britain and Europe” and “Britain Redux”) and Paul Stevens (“Spenser and 
the End of the British Empire”) invite us to rethink the relationship between Britain 
and Empire within Spenser studies and beyond.6 Baker and Stevens suggest that the 
“new British history” and imperial history are outmoded, because Empire is over, and 
a more transnational and multilingual approach is called for in approaching both 
Spenser and British history. Those essays have assumed greater relevance in the 
context of the outcome of the 2016 United Kingdom Referendum on membership of 
the European Union. Insofar as the British Empire remains the elephant in the room 
for Britain’s relationship with Europe and sense of itself in the world, Stevens’ 
argument can appear premature or wishful thinking. Insofar as British history – or 
ignorance thereof – remains a driver for anti-European sentiment, Baker’s well-
intentioned appeal for more culturally diverse approaches comes up against the 
bulwark of Britishness that acts as a brake on such diversity.  
 
The UK decision to withdraw from the EU has echoes of an earlier era. It also has 
Spenserian overtones, with “Belge” – Belgium, or the European Parliament at 
Brussels – being abandoned in favour of “taking our country back” (for “country”, 
read “imperial monarchy”, including constituent parts that voted to remain in 
Europe).7 This time, unlike Book V of The Faerie Queene, there appears to be no 
Arthur to rescue Belge, a red cross placed against her name. According to David 
Baker: “Edmund Spenser lived at a time when the charged relation between […] 
Britain and Europe […] was changing drastically”.8 Spenser lived through the 
aftermath of an historic moment in Anglo-European relations, when Henry VIII broke 
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with Rome, a decision with profound consequences for British state formation. 
Following this breach, Wales was incorporated into England and Ireland was changed 
from papal lordship to subordinate kingdom. Moves already afoot to bring Scotland 
aboard continued from the Rough Wooing through to the Treaty of Berwick and 
beyond. The question is: to what extent would Spenser have understood Brexit? As a 
good English European in terms of his cultural and intellectual formation, as well as 
his reforming interests, he might have applauded his nation’s efforts to assert itself 
and to challenge any existing European setup that appeared to marginalise 
England/Britain. As an English colonist, he may have welcomed the “Global 
Britain”/Commonwealth angles of some supporters of Brexit. Yet in other ways 
Spenser may have found the whole project dubious, because, like the Reformation, 
progressive strands that proposed an outward-looking perspective – a reformed 
Europe with England at its head – were entwined with more inward-looking attitudes. 
Such insularity and isolationism, as witness the cautious foreign policy to which the 
Leicester-Sidney circle took exception, is echoed in events in our own time. Like 
Brexit, the Henrician Reformation was fuelled by a grassroots movement that felt 
betrayed by the politicking that followed. Promises of greater freedoms were not 
fulfilled.9  
The Reformation was not an event, but, as Milton well knew, and spelt out in Of 
Reformation (1641), a messy and protracted and ongoing process. Milton, mapping 
out the reasons “why a complete Reform was not effected” pointed, among other 
things,  to Edward VI’s “Warre with Scotland”.10 If the Reformation is unfinished 
business, the same can be said of Brexit. The vote has taken place. The “nation” – or 
two nations of a composite monarchy or multi-nation state – has spoken, but the 
implications of that decision to withdraw have not been realised. Indeed, it could be 
argued that Brexit is more than an echo of the Reformation – it is Milton’s unfinished 
business being put back on the agenda. What kind of “nation” is Britain? And what 
place does it have in Europe. With another Elizabeth on the throne – and mindful of 
the fact that there never was an Elizabeth I of Scotland – the sense of history 
repeating itself has to be balanced with a sense of an arrested process playing out.11 
Spenser was actively engaged in several key events that shaped the Tudor state, 
including the Desmond Rebellion (1579-83), which secured his and England’s Irish 
foothold, and through the execution of Mary Queen of Scots and Dowager of France, 
the occasion for “one of the most notable of Spenser’s interventions in the affairs of 
Britain and Europe”.12 Mary’s cousin Elizabeth, in keeping with the Act in Restraint 
of Appeals, could claim a title greater than queen. Baker observes of Mary’s 
execution: “As in this episode, the histories of Britain and Europe impinged on 
Spenser’s works […] through the mediating involvement of the woman he called his 
‘Glorious Empress’”.13 According to Baker:  
 
In dealing with the great powers of her day, Spain and France, this queen 
worked to keep all parties – most of them men, of course – off balance and to 
avoid, as much as possible, direct confrontation. For the most part, these 
tactics suited the exigencies of a small, vulnerable kingdom that was 
geographically peripheral to Europe without being detached from its political 
struggles.14  
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Of course, the roots of English objections to Europe in the early modern period go 
back before the Reformation, to the pope’s donation in 1494 of the “New World” to 
Spain and Portugal.15 Then, as now, it was all about Empire, and all about the Atlantic 
archipelago, because it was all about keeping Europe out of Scotland and Ireland, 
viewed as England’s backyard. Like Scotland, Ireland was an integral part of Europe, 
and England’s aim here was also to shut the door, in this case to Spain. The defeat of 
the Armada in 1588 “signalled the emergence of England as a genuine sea power and 
demonstrated that England could hold its own against an empire”.16 But England 
could only hold its own against an empire by becoming the empire it had declared 
itself to be in 1533, and by holding Wales, Ireland and Scotland. Although Spenser in 
the View advised against mixing the Irish and the Scots, by the time his “Two Cantos 
of Mutabilitie” appeared the Ulster Plantation was well underway and the old out of 
the frying pan and into the fire trick had been pulled off. Eudoxus, we recall, asked 
Irenius about “that advice […] to draw in Scotts, to serve against [O’Neill]”. Irenius 
answers at length, concluding: “This then were but to leape out of the pan into the 
fire: For the cheifest caveat and provision in reformation of the North, must be to 
keep out those Scottes”.17 After 1609, the Scots were inextricably invested in the 
North of Ireland and bound to the nascent British state and Empire.  
 
The breach with Rome would rumble on in wars, invasions and occupations, in 
competition for colonies and in territorial and political disputes, but England, 
insulated and weaponized as Britain, had arguably turned its back on Europe. It is this 
history that lies behind recent developments. If Spenser can be seen as an eloquent 
exponent of the nascent English-cum-British Empire then he was also a resolutely 
European intellectual, who would hesitate long before turning his back on Europe. 
One could argue that in a different Europe the Spenser who carried letters to France in 
1569 would not have been fleeing Ireland in 1598. Remember that the Reformation 
created a crisis for younger sons, who, no longer able to enter the monasteries were 
forced to seek their fortune elsewhere. The expanding Tudor state, and specifically 
the colonies, provided a perfect platform for their ambitions and desire for land.  
 
Britain is now passing through another breach with Rome, in this case the 1957 
Treaty of Rome that laid the foundations of the European Union, and the 2007 Treaty 
of Lisbon (known as the “Reform Treaty”) that put in place the conditions for a 
member of the Union to withdraw. This is a constitutional continental crisis on a par 
with the events of the 1530s. Indeed, the ghost of the Reformation has been raised in 
order to address this historic shift, in the shape of the so-called “Henry VIII clauses”, 
and this has raised grave constitutional questions for British lawyers and legal 
historians.18 The clauses are succinctly described on the UK Parliament website: 
 
The Government sometimes adds this provision to a Bill to enable the 
Government to repeal or amend it after it has become an Act of Parliament. 
The provision enables primary legislation to be amended or repealed by 
subordinate legislation with or without further parliamentary scrutiny. Such 
provisions are known as Henry VIII clauses, so named from the Statute of 
Proclamations 1539 which gave King Henry VIII power to legislate by 
proclamation.19 
 
In the wake of Brexit, along with the Statute of Proclamations the 1533 Act in 
Restraint of Appeals to Rome and the 1534 Act of Supremacy are back on the table. A 
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“Divorce Bill” with profound implications for the future of Europe. The Empire 
strikes back, and ironically what it strikes back at is another Empire, bearing in mind 
that the 1533 Act stated that: “Where by divers sundry old authentic histories and 
chronicles it is manifestly declared and expressed that this realm of England is an 
empire, so hath been accepted in the world”.20 Of course, the Reformation was an 
archipelagic and European phenomenon and not merely an English one. It was also on 
one level a German intellectual import. Conflating the Reformation with Brexit 
arguably erases the European aspect of Protestant thought.21 Which is why my focus 
here is on the colonial and empire-building aspects of the two processes. Both the 
English Reformation and Brexit can be seen to be bound up with an appeal for the 
restoration of sovereignty – “taking our country back”. Or in the words of Donald 
Trump commenting on Brexit from a Scottish golf course and borrowing from his 
own lexicon: “Make Britain great again”.22  
 
In the wake of Brexit, Shakespeare’s histories are being ransacked for evidence of the 
roots and fruits of an earlier breach with Europe.23 Whatever its merits as a 
production, the 2016 anti-Brexit Cymbeline at Stratford is an example of harnessing 
Shakespeare in the interests of European union, and that particular play is itself a 
classic instance of history as allegory, revisiting the past in order to address the 
present.24 The transition from Tudor Reformation to Stuart Union is neatly 
encapsulated by Christopher Hodgkins in a series of questions that touch on, but 
extend beyond, Spenser: 
 
I ask what it meant for the part-Welsh queen of England in 1577 to hear Dee 
call her Arthur’s descendant and a British empress, and for her to read in the 
1590s of Spenser’s Britomart and her seer’s glass and of Merlin’s mirror. 
And what did it mean for the Scottish King James VI to ascend the English 
throne in 1604 and, claiming Arthurian descent, to rename his combined 
kingdoms with their ancient title of “Great Britain”? And what did it mean 
for James in 1610 to view Shakespeare’s Cymbeline, a tragicomedy of British 
resistance and eventual submission to imperial Caesar, set at the time of 
Christ’s first coming?25 
 
Hodgkins spends a whole monograph engaging with these questions, but his 
immediate answer captures the complexities and contradictions arising from Janus-
faced nationalism: 
 
This Tudor-Stuart project of expansive imperial recovery clearly meant that, 
like the early Protestant humanists before them, English writers from Dee and 
Hakluyt to Spenser and Shakespeare returned to “ancient” textual sources, 
recovering and reinventing the Matter of Britain. Yet as they did so, these 
writers combined often discordant elements that represented complicated 
responses to their own colonized past: medieval accounts of an inherited 
Trojan imperial identity intertwine with classical accounts of a native noble 
savagery. In the former, devolutionary view, British civility and empire 
preceded Rome’s imperial conquest; indeed, Geoffrey of Monmouth’s 
Arthur, like Malory’s, can claim that “mine ancestors did of yore obtain 
possession of Rome.” In the latter, tutelary view – derived from Tacitus 
through the Henrician antiquarian Polydore Vergil – hardy British wildness 
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was seasoned and trained by Roman imperial discipline but also was seduced 
and undermined by Roman dissipation.26 
 
To speak of the “Tudor-Stuart project” is arguably to assume a continuity that is itself 
questionable. Spenser’s Britomart could not have foreseen the Stuart succession, just 
as Irenius never envisaged planting the Scots in Ulster as a strategy that would prove 
advantageous to the English.    
The European flag – the flag of the European Union – is blue with a circle of twelve 
yellow stars. The stars stand for solidarity among the twenty-seven member states. 
Now Britain, like Texas, is angling to be a lone star state. The issue is whether it can 
go it alone, and what “alone” means for a multi-nation state. What might Spenser 
have to tell us about secession, union, disunion and empire that can orient us now?27 
Spenser’s relationship with Ireland has clouded the fact that as an Elizabethan 
Englishman he witnessed the beginnings of the “British Empire”, although there is a 
strong strand of Spenser scholarship that acknowledges this fact.28 As Catherine Bates 
reminds us: “When Arthur reads a book called Briton moniments […] it represents a 
history of history, a monument to other ‘moniments’ – of empire, of victory, of 
success – that find themselves inscribed on the cityscapes and countryside of Britain: 
it is the written record of a history that has already left its record on the land”.29 Yet 
despite Briton moniments, and our awareness that the poet was living through the 
birth of Britain as well as the beginnings of the British Empire, “Spenser and Ireland” 
is such a key coupling that other contexts – “Spenser and Britain”, “Spenser and 
Europe” – tend to get sidelined. Baker is surely right to suggest that Spenser was a 
key figure in the forging of the nation, an architect of the idea of Britain long before it 
emerged as an established entity:  
 
In the later years of the sixteenth century […] “Britain”, was not yet 
assembled as an effective political union. Strictly speaking, “Great Britain” 
would not come into existence until 1801. But Spenser invested in the 
imagining of such a polity throughout his career, and some of our conception 
of “Britain” as a splendid fusion of disparate nations we owe to him.30 
 
This “splendid fusion of disparate nations” might rankle with those for whom the 
formation of the British state entailed conquest, colonisation and coercion, but 
Baker’s point still stands. Spenser played a crucial role in the making of Britain. 
“Britain”, however, generally gets short shrift within Spenser studies. There is a curt 
mention in The Spenser Encyclopedia.31 “Europe” fares no better. It doesn’t even earn 
an entry on its own, though there is a brief entry on the myth of “Europa”, individual 
entries on “influence and reputation in” France and Germany, and a fruitful entry on 
“French Renaissance literature”.32 Discussing the political allegory of Book V, David 
Daiches spoke of “the modern reader, who neither agrees with the Elizabethan 
concept of justice nor retains any interest in the political problems of Spenser’s 
Europe”.33 Yet Spenser was a European, as much as his fellow colonial servant, 
Lodowick Bryskett, whose father, Antonio Bruschetto, came to England from Genoa, 
“and was granted letters of denization on 4 December 1536”.34 Bruschetto was caught 
up in Italian efforts aimed at reconciling England to Rome.35 Spenser’s familiarity 
with European poets such as Du Bellay, Marot, Petrarch, Ronsard and van der Noot 
has been noted.36 From classics to contemporaries, from Virgil to van der Noot, 
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Spenser knew the European tradition. He was also intimately acquainted with thinkers 
like Bodin and Machiavelli.37 Beyond Europe, there is the “New World”.38 Indeed, 
the break with Rome was bound up with that “New World”, driven by competition for 
colonies between nation-states that each aspired to imperial status. Spenser’s work is 
riddled with moments where European history and myth meshes with contemporary 
politics, most perplexingly in Muiopotmos, where the Bull (Papal, Spanish) that 
carries off Europa represents a continent being pulled in different directions, as 
Europe was at the time.39 Like the plight of Irena, held captive by Grantorto, the 
plight of Europa, carried off by continental powers with papal grant of colonial 
privileges is a call to arms for England: 
 
Arachne figur’d how Jove did abuse  
Europa like a Bull, and on his backe  
Her through the sea did beare.40 
 
Ireland, although firmly located within the Old World and within Europe, after a 
series of European invasions and occupations, was recolonized and occupied by the 
“New English” and treated like part of the “New World”. The persistent double image 
of the poet and planter, the colonial Spenser and the cultured Spenser, has proved 
notoriously hard to shake off. Patrick Cheney and Lauren Silberman’s attempts to 
present a “Worldmaking Spenser”, one “refusing bifurcation”, were dogged by the 
world-taking activities of the English in Ireland: 
 
The collective picture of Spenser that emerges is of a poet who is central to the 
formation of early modern Europe and to the continuing expansion of Western 
Europe. In this “postcolonial” age aggressively bent on “de-canonizing” 
Spenser for what Louis Montrose memorably terms Spenser’s “racist 
misogynist elitist imperialist biases” […], our picture may be more than 
controversial; it is worldmaking.41 
 
De-canonizing – or decolonizing – Spenser has its limitations. Globalizing him, 
whether in order to place him in the world as a worldmaker, or within a set of 
interlocking milieus that would include, in a European context, Ireland but also 
Scotland, France, Spain, Italy, and Holland, makes more sense.42 Spenser was 
certainly “central to the formation of early modern Europe”, central to and shaped by. 
The fact that he grew up in, and wrote in, what was in some ways – but only some 
ways – a post-European England/Britain has tended to obscure his European pedigree. 
In 1569 a teenage Spenser was apparently carrying correspondence from France for 
Henry Norris, Elizabeth’s ambassador there. The same year the young poet-courier 
published epigrams and sonnets from Petrarch and Du Bellay as part of Jan van der 
Noot’s Theatre for Worldlings.43 Translating French and Italian verses for a Dutch 
poet – those are strong European credentials. Spenser was made in Ireland, but he was 
also made by England turning back to and turning its back on a certain idea of Europe 
and towards another idea, that of Empire. Brexit Mark I was a shaping force. Without 
the trauma of the break with Rome and the need to recover – and invent – a distinct 
national tradition, there would be no Faerie Queene. Speaking of “the matter of just 
memory”, Andrew King observes:  
 
Like the Elizabethan antiquaries, Spenser sought to recover England’s Middle 
Ages as part of a Reformed nation’s full and rich history.  […] It is just that 
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The Faerie Queene should remember classical and humanist culture since 
these are the common inheritance of Europe. But it is also especially just that 
The Faerie Queene should remember and redeem its more particular past, the 
native traditions of romance writing that need not be scorned, either on literary 
grounds or because they predate the Reformation.44  
 
If Spenser was a poet of exile, where was he in exile from, England or Europe?45 Of 
course, it could be argued that there was no “Europe” as a coherent political, 
economic or cultural formation in the sixteenth century, outside of papal power, trade, 
traffic, a community of scholars, a common history and a shared language of learning 
in Latin. Then again, nor was there a coherent entity called “England”, as is evident 
from the extent to which the Tudor state’s rejection of Rome was bound up with 
Ireland, Scotland and Wales, and with imperial ambitions that would entail 
establishing a new England further afield. Spenser was part of these emergent colonial 
movements as the nascent British Empire began to take shape, but Europe remained a 
huge presence in Spenser’s work, and although it was never home for Spenser in the 
way that Ireland became, it is a persistent presence in his poetry.  
 
Commenting on Complaints, Anne Lake Prescott and Andrew Hadfield nail 
beautifully the double bind at the heart of the break with Rome, first through the fall 
of the Roman Empire, then through the Reformation: “Rome’s fall, however tragic, 
however indicative of mutability’s cruelty to flesh and cities, thus made room not 
only for modern poets but also for modern cities and modern empires”.46 Less 
convincing is their concomitant claim: “For Protestants […] the sight of Rome’s fall 
[…] was a reminder that modern Rome, the Rome of the Popes and, in anti-Catholic 
apocalyptic polemic, the Rome of the Whore of Babylon with her cup of 
abominations and her many-headed beast, would fall too, making room not for 
English empire but for God’s (Protestant) New Jerusalem”.47 The words “not for 
English empire” would have given some Protestants pause, because while there was a 
clear anti-imperialist strand to Reformation thought there was also – and the Act in 
Restraint of Appeals exemplifies this – a strong strand of imperial aspiration.48 
 
British history is to blame both for Spenser’s supposed exile to Ireland and for the 
tendency to view him largely within an English or Anglo-Irish framework rather than 
a Continental context. British history is central to The Faerie Queene, as are Anglo-
European relations. But British history is at once both very old – as old as Caesar and 
Boadicea – and relatively new. John Pocock’s plea for British history as a new subject 
– “the plural history of a group of cultures situated along an Anglo-Celtic frontier and 
marked by an increasing English political and cultural domination” – came at a 
crucial moment, in the wake of Britain joining in 1973 the European Economic 
Community (EEC), which had been established by the Treaty of Rome in 1957.49 
Pocock sensed that unrest in Ireland (again) and the growing influence of the 
European Union would put paid to Britain:  
 
Within very recent memory, the English have been increasingly willing to 
declare that neither empire nor commonwealth ever meant much in their 
consciousness, and that they were at heart Europeans all the time. The obvious 
absurdity of the second part of the claim is no bar either to the partial truth of 
the first part, or to the ideological assertion of the claim as a whole; and if it 
has been psychologically possible for them to annihilate the idea of the 
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Commonwealth – white as well as nonwhite – it is not altogether beyond the 
bounds of possibility that “United Kingdom” and even “Britain” may some 
day become similarly inconvenient and be annihilated, or annihilate 
themselves, in their turn. With communal war resumed in Ireland and a steady 
cost in lives being paid for the desire of one of the “British” peoples to remain 
“British” as they understand the term, it is not inconceivable that future 
historians may find themselves writing of a “Unionist” or even “British” 
period in the history of the peoples inhabiting the Atlantic archipelago, and 
locating it between a date in the thirteenth, the seventeenth, or the nineteenth 
century and a date in the twentieth or the twenty-first.50 
 
A peace process in Northern Ireland in the 1990s, within a European framework, 
appeared to end conflict there, but the British decision to withdraw from the European 
Union potentially imperils that peace by threatening to place a “hard border” between 
Northern Ireland and the Irish Republic. The Democratic Unionist Party (DUP) is 
meantime shoring up the British Government in the shape of the Conservative and 
Unionist Party (more commonly known as the Tories) in order to keep the latter in 
power. The Royal Irish Academy has meanwhile launched a “Brexit Taskforce” 
aimed at allaying the potential negative consequences for academic research.51 
 
Spenser can be viewed as a writer who challenged notions of purity, as when Irenius 
quickly qualifies his apparent slur against the Spanish in response to Eudoxus’s 
reproach: “I thinke there is no nation now in Christendome, nor much further, but is 
mingled, and compounded with others: for it was a singular providence of God, and a 
most admirable purpose of his wisedome, to draw those Northerne Heathen Nations 
downe into those Christian parts, where they might receive Christianity and to mingle 
nations so remote miraculously, to make as it were one blood and kindred of all 
people, and each to have knowledge of him”.52  
 
Lest we get carried away by Spenser’s apparent Christian-assimilationist view, it’s 
worth bearing in mind that he advocated the extermination of the Irish in pursuit of 
English colonial ambitions. Then again, this sixteenth-century Brexit is tied to the fact 
that the pope’s donation of the so-called “New World” to Spain and Portugal had 
already split Europe as the Old Empire (Rome) tried to hold onto its power. Dutch 
and English counter-claims would put paid to that plan. It could be argued further – as 
Milton does in The History of Britain (1670) – that England was freeing itself from a 
series of yokes – Roman, Danish, Saxon, Norman and Roman again.53 The irony, not 
lost on Milton, was that this unyoked entity might ironically come to resemble 
another Rome, as the newly-independent England morphed into the British imperial 
monarchy. Likewise, today Britain looks to its former colonies for support as it faces 
economic meltdown in a post-Brexit environment.54  
 
“Taking our country back” takes different forms. According to Marc Shell, “some 
American republicans argued that independence from England – and from British 
imperialism – required independence from English […] with […] shades of English 
anti-Normanism”.55 Shell’s footnote delves into Spenser: 
 
 
The English colonists’ rebellious discussions of ridding the United States of 
the English language and concomitant English political institutions were 
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themselves variations of English nationalist demands, common since Anglo-
Norman times, that the English language be purged of its “foreign” elements, 
chiefly Norman, and that pure English become, as Edmund Spenser puts it, 
“the kingdom of our own language”.56 
 
According to Paula Blank: “In the Renaissance, the English language became part of 
a cultural recreation myth according to which, by translating foreign languages into 
English, the early modern world would be ‘reborn’ as the British empire”.57 
 
Throughout the period, writers were testing the bounds of what Spenser 
referred to as “a kingdom of our own language” – not only among the local 
shires, but among the nations that fell within England’s imperial sphere. By 
1603, England’s most immediate neighbors, Wales, Scotland, and Ireland, had 
all been the object of English efforts towards annexation or union, and it is no 
coincidence that along with the native English dialects, “British” languages, 
from Irish Gaelic to Lowland Scots, make their first appearances in English 
literature in this period.58 
 
For Blank: “With Spenser, especially, the Renaissance ideal of linguistic community 
is exposed as a project of ‘translation’ by which one culture, one ‘people’, is 
transformed into another”.59  
 
In the View, Spenser invokes Rome as an exemplar of linguistic colonialism:  
 
For it hath ever beene the use of the conqueror, to despise the language of the 
conquered, and to force him by all meanes to learne his. So did the Romans 
alwayes use, insomuch that there is almost no nation in the world, but is 
sprinckled with their language.60 
 
The Roman inheritance and the European legacy more generally were inescapable. As 
Blank remarks: 
 
Spenser’s incorporation of dialect, foreign words, and neologisms in his 
diction suggests that the “unfamiliarity” and the novelty of Spenser’s 
archaisms – the fact that they were, as Puttenham observed, “now out of use 
with us” – was just as important to him as their antiquity. Their “strangeness” 
apparently met Spenser’s unusual specifications for a newly authorized 
English.61 
 
In his afterword to Worldmaking Spenser David Lee Miller reflects on the challenges 
of Spenser’s writing, formally, through the claim by Jonson that he “writ no 
language”, and politically, picking up on Louis Montrose’s pejorative remarks cited in 
that collection’s introduction: 
 
As postcolonialism and cultural studies provide increasingly dominant 
paradigms for literary study, will A View of the Present State of Ireland 
dislodge The Faerie Queene as Spenser’s best known and most frequently 
studied text? I hope not.62  
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I hope not too. Spenser’s poetry and prose are steeped in European culture, myth, and 
history, and should be read together as responses to a European crisis that remains 
relevant. The UK vote to leave the EU, like the election of Donald Trump, occurred 
on the back of a familiar discourse of exclusion. Empire and globalization have not 
been successful, but we need to be building bridges, not walls. A typo in Miller’s 
afterword holds out the promise of a reversal of the most recent break with Europe 
that we are living through: “Englightenment”. I live in hope.63  
 
 
Willy Maley 
University of Glasgow 
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